Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
C onsumers can purchase goods in any of several ways. They can buy in their own jurisdiction, paying sales taxes if the jurisdiction levies a sales tax. Alternatively, consumers can travel across a border and make their purchases in a different jurisdiction, paying the sales taxes that apply in that jurisdiction. A third possibility is that they can buy over the Internet.
1 Currently, state and local governments cannot require an online fi rm to collect sales taxes or use taxes, unless the fi rm has a physical presence (nexus) in the taxing jurisdiction. (See Fox and Murray (1997) for a discussion of the relevant Supreme Court rulings.) In 2003, several large retailers announced that they would begin to collect state sales tax on their online sales. Also, several states are attempting to negotiate an agreement for mutual enforcement of these taxes. Nevertheless, the data analyzed in this paper are for 1997 and 2001, which are years in which it is believed that evasion of sales taxes on Internet purchases was very substantial. data set for the United States that includes the general retail sales-tax rates in the consumer's home county and in adjacent counties. 3 Our results are consistent with the interpretation that Internet shopping, cross-border shopping, and home-county shopping are substitutes.
The literature on cross-border shopping includes both theoretical and empirical contributions. 4 For example, in a theoretical paper, Ohsawa (1999) uses a Hotelling-type model of spatial competition to examine the effects of the size and spatial arrangement of countries on tax rates and government revenues, in a Nash-equilibrium setting. There is also a substantial empirical literature. Gordon and Nielsen (1997) estimate that 3.9 billion Danish Kroner of value added escaped taxation by Denmark in 1992 because of cross-border shopping. FitzGerald (1992) fi nds substantial evidence of tax-induced cross-border shopping between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom. Ferris (2000) analyzes border crossings from Canada to the United States from 1972 to 1997, and finds that taxes play a significant role, as do exchange rates and other variables. Garrett and Marsh (2002) use 1998 county-level data from Kansas to investigate cross-border lottery shopping between Kansas and its neighboring states. Their results suggest that the Kansas lottery gains revenue from Oklahomans who cross into Kansas, but suffers a net loss of revenue because of Kansans who cross into Missouri and Nebraska.
There is also a recent literature on the effects of taxation on Internet sales. Goolsbee (2000) tests the relationship between sales-tax rates and Internet purchases, using data for 1997 from Forrester Research (a market research company). Goolsbee knows the metropolitan area in which a consumer lives, but not the county of residence. Thus, Goolsbee assumes that the tax rate is uniform throughout each metropolitan area. 5 Alm and Melnik (2005) also investigate the effects of sales-tax rates on Internet purchases. They use data from the Current Population Survey for 2001. They defi ne the tax rate at the state level, using the lowest sales-tax rate available to the consumer in his/her state of residence.
In this paper, we also use the Current Population Survey. However, we exploit the fact that the county of residence is known for some of the respondents in the sample. Thus, we defi ne the sales-tax rate at the county level. Performing the analysis at the county level plays an important role in our study of cross-border shopping because the extent of cross-border shopping is likely to diminish with distance. 6 Virtually all residents of the United States are fairly close to a county boundary, but many are much farther from the nearest state line. 7 Goolsbee (2000) and Alm and Melnik (2005) address only the tax-evasion aspect of Internet shopping (i.e., they do not deal with cross-border shopping). Goolsbee fi nds that Internet purchases are highly 3 Throughout this paper, we use "county" to refer to counties as well as to county equivalents, such as the parishes of Louisiana. 4 For a concise summary of the literature on cross-border shopping, see Bruce and Fox (2005) . 5 Goolsbee deals with this problem in a variety of ways. For example, in one specifi cation, he restricts his sample to observations from states with uniform sales-tax rates within the state. 6 For example, in a study of Swedes who cross into Denmark to purchase alcohol, Asplund, Friberg, and Wilander (2005) fi nd that distance from the border has a substantial negative effect on cross-border shopping. For further evidence on the importance of distance, see Engel and Rogers (1996) . 7 By defi ning the sales-tax rate at the county level, we also reduce the extent of measurement error in this variable. In some states and metropolitan areas, there is substantial variation in sales-tax rates. By defi ning the sales-tax rate at the level of the county, we capture most of this variation. The details of our tax-rate calculations are described below. One shortcoming of our approach is that information on county of residence is not available for a substantial fraction of the individuals in the CPS data set.
sensitive to sales taxes, with tax-price elasticities in the range of two to four. Alm and Melnik also fi nd a signifi cant effect of sales taxes on Internet purchases, although their estimated tax-price elasticities are much smaller, around 0.5. We also fi nd that Internet purchases are signifi cantly more likely for consumers who face higher sales-tax rates, all else equal. Our estimated tax-price elasticities are closer to those of Alm and Melnik than to those of Goolsbee. Even so, we consider the quantitative magnitude of the effects to be fairly substantial.
We also find that consumers whose home county is adjacent to a county with a lower sales-tax rate are signifi cantly less likely to use the Internet for shopping, all else equal. This does not provide any direct evidence regarding cross-border shopping, but it is consistent with the interpretation that consumers are engaging in cross-border shopping.
The focus of most of this literature is on the effect of tax rates. Clearly, however, the defi nition of the tax base also has the potential to affect shopping behavior. There is wide variation among the states in the definition of which goods and services are subject to the retail sales tax. We include a variable that is designed to capture this effect. We fi nd that Internet shopping is signifi cantly more likely for consumers who reside in states in which the base of the sales tax is broader, all else equal. Thus, our results suggest that consumers may use the Internet to avoid sales taxation, because of a high sales-tax rate in their jurisdiction, and/or because the sales tax in their jurisdiction applies to a wide range of purchases.
DATA AND VARIABLES
We use data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) for 1997 and 2001. 8 Our key dependent variable, SHOP INTERNET, measures whether a consumer engages in online shopping. SHOP INTERNET is a binary variable.
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The CPS data include some individuals who have access to the Internet, but also some who do not. If we were to restrict the sample to include only those who have access to the Internet, there is the possibility of sample-selection bias. We deal with the issue of sample selection by estimating a system of two probit equations, including a selection equation for Internet access, as well as the equation for Internet shopping. The variable that measures whether the consumer has access to the Internet, ACCESS INTERNET, is also a binary variable.
One key explanatory variable is HOME TAX PRICE, which is the tax price associated with the sales tax of the consumer's home county. HOME TAX PRICE = (1 + t h ), where t h is the sales-tax rate in the home county (measured as a proportion). The states can be divided into four categories, with respect to their general retail sales taxes. First, there are no general retail sales taxes in Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon, either at the state level or at the county level.
10 Second, 13 states impose a uniform sales-tax rate throughout the state, 11 and the District of Columbia has a uniform sales-tax rate within its borders. Third, eight states have variation in sales-tax rates across counties, but no variation within counties.
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For the remaining 25 states, there are variations in sales-tax rates, both across counties and within counties (i.e., cities within the same county can have different sales-tax rates). However, although we know the sales-tax rates in each city, we only have data on the county of residence. Thus, we calculate a weighted average sales-tax rate for each county, using the populations of cities within the county as weights. All consumers in a given county are then assumed to face the same sales-tax rate.
Our data on sales-tax rates were collected by a variety of methods, including telephone and mail contacts with state and county revenue offi cials, as well as visits to the websites maintained by some state and county revenue offi ces. In many counties, the sales-tax rate was the same in 1997 as it had been in 2001. In jurisdictions where the tax rates did change during this period, the changes were usually small. Thus, most of the variation in HOME TAX PRICE in our pooled cross-section data set is across counties, rather than across years.
We also include a variable that measures the relationship between the sales-tax rate in the consumer's home county and the sales-tax rates in the immediately adjoining counties. This variable, TAXRATIO, is (1 + t h )/(1 + t f ), where t h is the sales-tax rate of the home county and t f is the minimum of the sales-tax rates among all of the adjacent counties.
This specifi cation for TAXRATIO does not necessarily capture all aspects of cross-border shopping. For instance, a consumer may engage in cross-border shopping by going two or more counties away, rather than to an adjoining county. Also, we treat everyone in a given county the same, regardless of whether he or she lives close to the county line or miles away. Nevertheless, we argue that this variable provides valuable information regarding the incentives for cross-border shopping.
HOME TAX PRICE and TAXRATIO are calculated on the basis of sales-tax rates. However, the effects of the sales tax in a given jurisdiction will depend on the tax base, as well as on the tax rate. (If an item is excluded from the sales-tax base, its effective sales-tax rate is zero, regardless of the statutory sales-tax rate.) There is considerable variation among the states in the base of the sales tax. (Although counties have some latitude to set the sales-tax rate in 33 of the 46 states with a retail sales tax, the tax base is set at the state level.) 13 There may also be cross-state differences in the intensity of sales-tax enforcement. As a result of these differences, there is variation among the states in sales-tax revenue, even when we hold constant the level of the sales-tax rates. In an attempt to control for these differences, we have created a variable called TAXBASE. In creating TAXBASE, we begin by calculating the sales tax as a percentage of personal income in each state.
14 We then divide by the weighted average of the sales-tax rates in the state. For TAXBASE, as for HOME TAX PRICE, there is considerable variation by region, but relatively little variation across years. LOGINCOME is the log of the resident's household income. We expect a positive coeffi cient for LOGINCOME, since use of the Internet for purchases is almost certain to be a normal activity.
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FEMALE, WHITE, and MARRIED are binary variables for the individual's demographic characteristics. HIGHGRAD, COLLGRAD, and PROGRAD are a set of dummy variables for the individual's education level, indicating whether his or her highest level of educational attainment is a high-school diploma (HIGHGRAD), a Bachelor 's degree (COLLGRAD), or an M.A., Ph.D., or professional degree (PROGRAD). (The omitted category is the group who have less than a high-school education.) NUMCOMP is the number of computers in the household. AGE15, AGE20, AGE30, AGE50, and AGE60 are a set of age-group dummy variables. For example, AGE15 is equal to one if the consumer's age is from 15 to 19, AGE20 equals one for consumers aged from 20 to 29, and AGE60 equals one for those whose age is greater than or equal to 60. (The omitted category is the group of consumers aged 40-49.) D2001 is a dummy variable, equal to one when an observation is taken in 2001, and zero when it is taken in 1997.
We include the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index (which we call CPI-CHANGE) as an explanatory variable.
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The infl ation rate in the local area may play a role in driving consumer awareness of the desirability of out-of-area shopping methods, such as mail-order shopping and Internet shopping. Therefore, we expect infl ation rates to have a positive effect on Internet shopping. Table 1 presents summary statistics for several of the most important variables in our data set. Table 1 includes separate columns for those without Internet access, those with Internet access who do shop online, and those with Internet access who do not shop online, as well as for the entire sample. Not surprisingly, the sample is predominantly white. More than half of the individuals in our sample are married.
For the sample as a whole, the average sales-tax rate at the county level is about 6.29 percent. The means reported in Table  1 suggest that those with Internet access tend to be somewhat younger, more affl uent, and more highly educated than those without Internet access. Those with Internet access are also more likely to be unmarried, white, and male, although the differences among the sub-groups tend to be relatively modest. Of course, caution must be used when interpreting simple univariate means. In particular, the simple means in Table 1 indicate that sales-tax rates are actually lower for Internet shoppers than for Internet users who do not shop, on average. This simple univariate relationship would appear to contradict our hypotheses. However, multivariate analysis suggests that Internet shopping is more likely for those who face higher sales-tax rates, all else equal.
The mean value of TAXRATIO is about 1.0066. This indicates that the average individual in our sample lives adjacent to a county in which the sales-tax rate is about two-thirds of one percentage point lower than in his or her home county.
The mean value of TAXBASE is about 0.41. This means that, on average, each percentage point of sales-tax rate generates sales-tax revenue equal to about four-tenths of one percent of personal income. One important reason why the mean value of TAXBASE is less than one is that, in most states, the sales tax applies to relatively few services.
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
Counties may differ in a variety of ways, even when they are in the same state, and even when they have the same sales-tax rate. (For example, some counties have better Internet infrastructure and/or better transportation networks than others.) Therefore, we control for county effects in all of our econometric specifi cations.
Our dependent variable, SHOP INTER-NET, is equal to one if the consumer shops over the Internet, and zero otherwise. It is possible to use SHOP INTER-NET as the dependent variable in a standard probit model, using the sample of Internet users. However, this procedure will not necessarily generate consistent estimates. The coeffi cients may be subject to sample-selection bias, because a consumer can only shop online if he or she has access to the Internet in the fi rst place.
Thus, a superior estimation strategy is to use maximum-likelihood techniques to estimate simultaneously a probit equation for Internet access and a probit equation for Internet shopping. (For discussion of models of this type, see Alm and Skidmore (1999) and Van De Ven and Van Praag (1981) . In equation [1] , SHOP INTERNET* is a latent variable, x is a vector of explanatory variables, β is a vector of coeffi cients, and u is an error term. In equation [2] , ACCESS INTERNET* is a latent variable, z is a vector of explanatory variables, γ is a vector of coeffi cients, and e is an error term.
We specify equation [1] using the explanatory variables already described, along with a full set of interactions among the variables for race, sex, and marital status. Thus, 17 See Bruce, Deskins, and Fox (2004) for an empirical study of the effects of tax variables and other infl uences on Internet access.
It is possible for the Internet-shopping equation to include all of the variables in [4] . However, if the selection equation and the equation of primary interest include the same set of explanatory variables, identification is achieved exclusively through the non-linearity of the probit. Thus, it is preferable for at least one of the explanatory variables in the sample-selection equation to be absent from the equation of primary interest. (For discussion, see Wooldridge (2002) and Van Ham and Bu "chel (2004) .) We will report on five specifi cations of the maximum-likelihood model, in which different combinations of variables are excluded from the Internet-shopping equation. For purposes of comparison, one of these specifi cations includes the same set of explanatory variables in both the selection equation and the equation of interest.
We assume that the error terms in the two equations are distributed according to a bivariate standard normal distribution. Following the notation of Alm and Skidmore (1999), we denote the correlation between u and e as ρ ue . If ρ ue = 0, probit estimates based on the selected sample of those with Internet access would be consistent. However, in the more general case in which ρ ue is nonzero, probit estimates based on the selected sample will be biased, since
The likelihood function for this model is where N 1 refers to those who do not have access to the Internet, N 2 refers to those who have access to the Internet but do not shop over the Internet, N 3 refers to those who have access to the Internet and do shop over the Internet, Φ 1 is the univariate standard normal density function, and Φ 2 is the bivariate standard normal density function.
Results for Internet Access
Our results are shown in Table 2 . 18 The fi rst part of Table 2 shows the estimates for the Internet-shopping equation; the second part shows the estimates for the Internet-access equation. We begin our discussion of the results from the system of two equations by looking briefl y at the results for Internet access.
For most variables, the coeffi cients and signifi cance levels in the Internet-access equation are quite similar across the fi ve specifi cations in Table 2 . Thus, readers can get a good sense of the results by scanning down any of the fi ve columns. We have a slight preference for Specifi cation (2), because the interaction terms excluded from the Internet-shopping equation in that specifi cation have insignifi cant effects in all of our other specifi cations.
19 18 The z-statistics reported in Table 2 are robust z-statistics, adjusted for cluster sampling within counties. 19 It is not clear that any of our variables is an ideal instrument. As can be seen from The numbers in parentheses are robust z-statistics. ***, **, and * denote signifi cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. These estimates are for specifi cations that include county dummies.
The results in the second part of Table  2 suggest that consumers in a high-tax county are more likely to have Internet access, and that those who live adjacent to a low-tax county are less likely to have Internet access. However, these effects are not statistically signifi cant.
20 Table 2 also indicates that higher-income consumers are signifi cantly more likely to have Internet access than those with lower incomes. Those with at least a high-school education are signifi cantly more likely to have Internet access than those without a high-school education. Not surprisingly, the coeffi cient on the variable NUMCOMP (number of computers in the household) indicates that households with more computers are signifi cantly more likely to have Internet access. The results indicate that Internet access (as opposed to Internet shopping) decreases monotonically with age.
The estimates of ρ ue (rho) are significantly different from zero in all fi ve of our specifi cations. 21 Thus, the error term in the Internet-access equation is correlated with the error term in the Internet-shopping equation. This means that the simple probit model based on the selected sample of Internet users is indeed subject to sample-selection bias, so that it is appropriate to use the model in which Internet access and Internet shopping are estimated as a system.
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Results for Internet Shopping
The results for the Internet-shopping equation are shown in the fi rst part of Table 2 . Below, we will consider the coeffi cients for the tax variables, HOME TAX PRICE, TAXRATIO, and TAXBASE. First, however, we consider some of the results for the non-tax variables.
(i) The coefficient estimate of LOG-INCOME is positive and statistically signifi cant. Thus, an increase in income is associated with an increase in the probability that a consumer would engage in online shopping, all else equal.
(ii) The dummy variables for educational attainment (HIGHGRAD, COL-LGRAD, and PROGRAD) have positive signs, and most are highly statistically significant. These results suggest that those with a high-school diploma or a Bachelor's degree are more likely to use the Internet for shopping than those with less than a high-school education. Those with a graduate or professional degree are also more likely to shop via the Internet than those with less than a high-school education, although the effect is smaller than the effect of a high-school diploma or a Bachelor's degree.
(iii) The coeffi cients for the age-related dummy variables (AGE15, AGE20, etc.) indicate that the probability of Internet purchases has an inverse-U-shaped pattern by age, and that this pattern is statistically signifi cant. The probability of Internet purchases rises until consumers are in their thirties, and then declines. Our conjecture is that teenagers are less likely to engage in online shopping because they are less likely to have access to credit, and that the elderly may be less familiar and less comfortable with online 20 Our estimate of the effect of the sales-tax rate on Internet access is of the same sign as the estimate of Bruce, Deskins, and Fox (2004) . By contrast, however, their estimate (based on data at the state level) is strongly statistically signifi cant. 21 In Specifi cations (1), (2), (3), and (5), the p-value for rho is 0.0000. The p-value is 0.0677 for Specifi cation (4). 22 However, for purposes of comparsion, we also ran a simple probit model using the selected sample of consumers with Internet access. (The results are available upon request.) For many of the variables in the Internet-shopping equation, the coeffi cient estimates and levels of signifi cance for the selected sample are very similar to those reported in Table 2 . This suggests that, even though the simple probit model suffers from a selection bias that is statistically signifi cant, the quantitative magnitude of the bias is not necessarily very large. We also estimated the linear probability model. The results, which are available on request, are very similar to the probit results, in terms of the magnitude of the marginal effects, as well as the signifi cance levels.
shopping, even after controlling for other variables.
(iv) The coeffi cient on the dummy variable for the year 2001, D2001, is large, positive, and highly signifi cant. This is not surprising, since Internet usage increased very substantially between 1997 and 2001. Under the specifi cation reported here, in which the year enters only as a dummy variable, we constrain the coeffi cient on HOME TAX PRICE to be the same in both years. However, it is possible that the behavioral response to taxes may have changed between 1997 and 2001. We tested this by including an interaction term between the tax-rate variable and the year. We found a signifi cant effect in the equation for Internet access. However, the effect in the equation for Internet shopping was extremely small. (The z value on the coeffi cient for the interaction term was -0.01.) The results from the regression with the interaction term are available upon request.
Our assessment of these results is that most of the coeffi cients for the non-tax variables in the Internet-shopping equations (shown in the top portion of Table  2 ) can be interpreted in reasonable ways. Many of the coeffi cients are highly signifi cant, and the magnitudes are economically meaningful.
The results in Table 2 also lend support to our hypotheses regarding the infl uence of sales taxes on Internet shopping. In each of the specifi cations in Table 2 , the coeffi cient for the tax price in the local county (HOME TAX PRICE) has the expected positive sign, and it is statistically significant at the fi ve-percent level. These results indicate that, all else equal, a resident of a county with a higher sales-tax rate is substantially more likely to use the Internet for shopping than a resident of a county with a lower sales-tax rate. These results are consistent with the notion that Internet shopping is used, in part, as a mechanism for sales-tax evasion.
In each of the specifi cations in Table 2 , the coeffi cient for TAXRATIO in the Internet-shopping equation has the expected negative sign, and is also signifi cant at the fi ve-percent level. The negative coeffi cient on TAXRATIO indicates that a consumer whose county is adjacent to a lower-tax county is less likely to use the Internet for shopping than he or she would otherwise be, all else equal. This result is consistent with an interpretation that involves cross-border shopping: All else equal, the tax benefi ts from Internet shopping are reduced if a lower-tax county is nearby. Because the sales-tax burden can be reduced, simply by driving across the county line to shop, those who live near a lower-tax county have less of an incentive to shop via the Internet, all else equal.
Recall that TAXBASE is defined as the sales-tax revenue as a proportion of personal income in a state, normalized by the weighted-average sales-tax rate in the state. In each of the specifi cations in Table 2 , the coeffi cient for TAXBASE has the expected positive sign, and it is signifi cant at the one-percent level. This suggests that, even after we control for the tax rates themselves, the relative amount of sales-tax revenue collected has an effect on Internet-shopping behavior. Some states may have a high value of TAXBASE because the sales tax applies to more goods and services, while others may have a high value of TAXBASE because of more stringent sales-tax enforcement. In either case, a high value of TAXBASE means that (holding constant the tax rates), the sales tax reaches further. Thus, shoppers have a stronger incentive to shop via the Internet. The results for TAXBASE point in the same direction as the results for HOME TAX PRICE: Sales taxes encourage Internet shopping, either because the sales-tax rate itself is high or because the sales tax is widely applied.
Our interpretation of the results for HOME TAX PRICE and TAXRATIO is that shopping in the home county, shopping in an adjacent county, and shopping on the Internet are all substitutes. Goolsbee (2000) and Alm and Melnik (2005) estimate the effect of the tax price on Internet shopping; they also fi nd that a consumer who faces a high tax price would be more likely to engage in online shopping. Thus, broadly speaking, our results are consistent with those of Goolsbee and Alm and Melnik.
When we recover the marginal effects associated with the probit coeffi cients, we can calculate the elasticity of Internet shopping with respect to HOME TAX PRICE. Note that an increase in the tax price in the home county will also lead to an increase in the ratio of the tax price in the home county to the lowest of the tax rates in adjacent counties. Thus, a complete calculation of the elasticity of Internet shopping with respect to HOME TAX PRICE would also include the indirect effect through a change in TAX-RATIO. A one-percent increase in HOME TAX PRICE would increase TAXRATIO by slightly more than 0.01. This, in turn, would decrease the probability of using the Internet for shopping, all else equal. For our preferred equation (Specification (2)), if we combine the direct effect through HOME TAX PRICE with the indirect effect through TAXRATIO, the resulting tax-price elasticity is about 0.198.
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CONCLUSION
A previous literature has provided estimates of the effect of sales-tax rates on Internet shopping, and another literature has considered the effect of taxes on cross-border shopping. Each of these is important to state and local governments, which have experienced a decline in their ability to raise revenues through sales taxes. We integrate these two avenues of research, by analyzing empirically the determinants of Internet shopping in the United States, using data from the Current Population Survey for 1997 and 2001.
The data indicate whether consumers used the Internet for shopping, and we use this binary variable as our dependent variable. Our data set also includes the sales-tax rate in the consumer's local county, a measure of the sales-tax rates in adjacent counties, a measure of the breadth of the sales tax in the consumer's state, and a wide range of economic and demographic variables.
We estimate a system of equations, with a probit selection equation for Internet access, as well as a probit equation for Internet shopping. In all of our estimates, we fi nd that the probability of Internet shopping is higher for those with higher incomes, all else equal. The probability of Internet shopping increases rapidly with age until consumers are in their thirties, and then decreases. Those with less than a high-school education are less likely to use the Internet for shopping than those with more education, all else equal. And, not surprisingly, we fi nd a sharp increase in the propensity to use the Internet for shopping between 1997 and 2001.
The effects of the tax-rate variables on Internet shopping are always of the predicted sign, and they are statistically signifi cant in all cases. In addition, the coeffi cients for the tax-rate variables are fairly robust across our different model specifi cations. The sales-tax rate in the consumer's own county has a positive effect on online shopping, all else equal. Our interpretation is that those who live in areas with high sales-tax rates are more likely to use the Internet for shopping, because sales-tax evasion on Internet sales is not diffi cult, and the benefi t from evasion is greater when the sales-tax 23 We also estimated the model using HOME TAX PRICE as the only tax-related explanatory variable. (In other words, in this case, we eliminated TAXRATIO and TAXBASE from both the selection equation and the Internet-shopping equation.) The results from this specifi cation are probably most directly comparable with the results of Goolsbee and Alm and Melnik. In this case, the tax-price elasticity is about 0.399. rate is higher. In addition, we fi nd that Internet purchases are less likely for those who reside in a county that is adjacent to another county with a lower sales-tax rate, all else equal. We interpret this as evidence of cross-border shopping. When we account for the direct marginal effect of the home-county tax price, as well as the indirect effect on the relationship between the home-county tax rate and the lowest tax rate in an adjacent county, the taxprice elasticity is about 0.20. These elasticity estimates are closer to those of Alm and Melnik (2005) than to the higher estimates of Goolsbee (2000) . However, this does not suggest to us that the behavioral responses are terribly small. We hope we have contributed to an emerging consensus that the effects are fairly substantial, although there remains controversy in the literature about the precise quantitative magnitude of the effects. Goolsbee (2000) and Alm and Melnik (2005) focus exclusively on tax rates. However, holding constant the statutory sales-tax rate, a state could have high sales-tax revenues because the sales tax applies to more items, or because the sales tax is enforced more rigorously, or both. In either case, a more extensive sales tax would provide a larger incentive for Internet shopping, all else equal. In this paper, we introduce a new variable that is designed to capture the effect of differences in the sales-tax base. This new variable is sales-tax revenue as a proportion of personal income in a state, normalized by the weighted average of the sales-tax rates in the state. We fi nd that, even after controlling for the tax rates themselves, the relative amount of tax revenue has an important effect on Internet shopping behavior: All else equal, Internet purchases are more likely for those who reside in a state in which sales-tax revenues are a larger fraction of personal income, after normalizing by sales-tax rates. We interpret this as additional evidence that consumers respond to the tax-related incentive to use the Internet for shopping. Goolsbee (2000) and Alm and Melnik (2005) make very substantial contributions. We believe that our paper advances the profession's understanding beyond these earlier papers in three ways. First, we investigate cross-border shopping and sales-tax evasion through Internet shopping in a single framework. We consider both the effect of the tax rate in the consumer's local jurisdiction, and the effects of tax rates in adjacent jurisdictions.
Second, we defi ne some of the tax-rate variables at the county level. We believe that this allows us to measure the tax-rate variables with greater precision. We also believe that this is crucial for our study of cross-border shopping. It would be very diffi cult to study cross-border shopping in a meaningful way, unless tax rates can be defi ned over reasonably small geographic areas.
Third, we introduce a new variable that is designed to capture differences in the sales-tax base. Previous papers in this literature control for tax rates, but not for the tax base. Our results indicate that tax rates and the tax base have similar effects: High sales-tax rates encourage Internet shopping, as do sales taxes that are widely applied.
The dependent variable in our study indicates whether the consumer uses the Internet for shopping. Unfortunately, we do not have information on the dollar value of the Internet shopping that is undertaken by the consumers in our sample. Consequently, any attempt to use our results to estimate the effects of the Internet on sales-tax revenue would have to be fairly speculative.
Our data are taken from a time period when the Internet was still in its infancy. As this new medium of commerce becomes more and more a regular feature of the economic landscape, we anticipate that the determinants of Internet shopping may change, possibly by a substantial amount.
Thus, we do not consider our estimates to be the last word on the subject. Instead, we look forward to further research.
